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At its December, 1984 Plenary Session, the Administrative Conference of the
United States devoted a part of its agenda to an exchange of ideas on the current
state of administrative law and the directions in which this field is likely to move-
or be pushed-in the foreseeable future. Perhaps because modern administrative
agencies are such a curious admixture of the political, bureaucratic, and judicial
components of government, the study of administrative law derives particular ben-
efits from analyses and critiques that emphasize social utility as well as legal pre-
cedent. In no other area of the law do the current political agenda and social
climate affect so directly both the legal process and its end products.
The deliberately provocative essay that follows was written especially for this
year's Administrative Law Issue by Loren A. Smith, Chairman of the Administra-
tive Conference. Mr. Smith argues that the current level of judicialization and
overproceduralization of the administrative process is a symptom of a fundamen-
tal dysfunction. He reminds us that formal methodologies cannot by themselves
resolve the difficult issues that inevitably arise in the context of those important
social programs placed under the auspices of the administrative agencies and ar-
gues that an infatuation with procedural safeguards-the traditional focus of ad-
ministrative law studies-is counterproductive insofar as it has the effect of
diverting attention away from critical substantive problems. "Hard looks, " Mr.
Smith concludes, may be a frustrated body politic's way of avoiding "hard
choices," and he calls for a renewed recognition of the essentially political--and
hence fully accountable-nature of the federal administrative process.
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"The danger is not that a particular class is unfit to govern. Every class
is unfit to govern."1
The "judicialization of the administrative process" is a phrase de-
scriptive of several related phenomena. It is probably used most often to
refer to the active participation of the courts, through extensive judicial
review, in the decisions of executive bodies.2 But it can also refer to the
expanding use of trial-like procedures for making governmental deci-
sions, 3 and, more generally, to overproceduralization and excessive com-
plexity in the process of making public policy decisions.4 This essay is
1. LORD ACrON, LETrERS OF LORD ACTON TO MARY GLADSTONE 93 (H. Paul ed. 1904).
2. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Cramnton, Judicial Law Making and Administration, 36 PUB. AD. REV. 551 (1976);
Horowitz, The Courts as Guardians of the Public Interest, 37 PuB. AD. REv. 148 (1977); Kidney,
Are Judges Getting Too Powerful?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1978, at 39; Press, When
Judges Govern, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1979, at 79; Symposium on Judicial Activism: Problems and
Responses, 7 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1984). One focus of the scholarly attention given in
recent years to aggressive judicial review of administrative programs and decisions has been the
proper use of the Constitution by the judiciary in this context. The major schools of thought on this
issue are reviewed in Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981), and Stewart & Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982).
3. See, for example, the "hybrid" rulemaking procedures of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193
(1975) (codified, as amended, at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982)). Reviewing courts have also contributed
significantly to this trend, imposing, if not always "courtroom-like procedures," at least additional
non-statutory procedural requirements on various kinds on agencies. See, e.g., Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 58 (D.C. Cir.) (requiring evidentiary hearings to determine the nature of
certain ex parte FCC contacts), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d
1238, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (evidentiary procedures in a ratesetting proceeding must be sufficiently
adversarial in nature to provide a reasonable guarantee of reliability). This judicial development was
stemmed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), in which it was held that the courts may not
superimpose their own ideas of appropriate administrative procedure if agencies' choices have met
the minimum standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The
APA, the D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345; Verkuil, The Emerging
Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 288-90 (1978). But cf Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (fourteenth amendment requires that state welfare termination proce-
dures include an adversarial pretermination hearing with certain trial-like characteristics); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985) (pretermination opportunity to
be heard constitutionally required in connection with dismissal of a state employee dischargeable
only for cause).
4. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982), and the
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552, 552b, 556-557, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 at 983, 39
U.S.C. § 410 (1982), which apply to a wide range of government activities, are examples of this
proceduralization, much of which is directed at ensuring opportunities for participation by interested
parties in the policymaking process. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HAR v. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975) ("Increasingly, the function of administrative law is not the
protection of private autonomy but the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair
representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decision.").
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about all of these manifestations ofjudicialization, because they all reflect
a common underlying trend in our polity.
The thesis of this essay is that modem administrative law increas-
ingly has fallen victim to self-deception. A significant part of administra-
tive law theory is based on a fallacy as dysfunctional in that system as the
belief in a two-dimensional earth was for the geography of the fifteenth
century. The fallacy is that we can make social and economic decisions
by means of formal processes and legal procedures without the exercise
of political will. We have come to believe that public hearings, public
disclosure of all documents relevant to a given issue, and trial-type meth-
odologies for testing ideas will lead to "better" social and economic poli-
cies by government decisionmakers having power over large sections of
the economic and social life of the nation. This attitude leads to an ex-
cessive focus on the process rather than the substance of governmental
decisions. It is a fallacy that diverts us from the recognition that a gov-
ernment's decisions must ultimately be judged by the values embodied in
that government's constitutional mandate-that is, by moral values de-
rived from the society's culture and traditions. Government ultimately
must be judged by such substantive moral standards if the terms "good
government" and "bad government" are to have any meaning.
Of course, procedures and courts do have a role to play. They act as
instruments of restraint. They keep-rather than make-the political
system democratic and constitutional. At their best they function as the
banks of a great river; they keep government from inundating the land.5
But procedures and courts can make governmental decisions substan-
tively "better" only when the decisions to be made are judicial rather
than political in character. 6 Entrusting by default the task of political
decisionmaking-and most significant government decisions have a large
political component-to those who are constitutionally bound to dis-
claim that role is to engage in sleight of hand; the real decisionmakers
5. Justice Cardozo used a variant of this metaphor with reference to the delegation of legisla-
tive power in his dissent in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) (the discretion granted "is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.").
6. Consider in this context Chief Justice Marshall's remarks in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824) (emphasis added):
[Tihe legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well constructed government, are
co-extensive with each other; that is, they are potentially co-extensive.. . . All govern-
ments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess, within them-
selves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws. If we examine the
constitution of the United States, we find that its framers kept this great political principle
in view ...
[The "arising under" clause of article III] enables the judicial department to receive
jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
when any question respecting them shall assume such aform that thejudicial power is capa-
ble of acting on it
Vol. 1985:427]
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and the full dimensions of their political decisions are kept out of sight
and thereby escape rigorous social review. To the extent that we judicial-
ize government, we necessarily tend to see the failures of economic and
social programs not as manifestations of wrong-headed policies, but as
bad technique or the flawed work of wrong-headed administrators. Such
an orientation paralyzes our political system, makes policy direction in-
creasingly less relevant, and leads to increased dissatisfaction with gov-
ernment. Thus, judicialization-the comprehensive expression of the
fallacy I am describing-masks real policy disputes and problems with
an ephemeral debate over procedure and the structure of governmental
decisionmaking. In some ways this result may be comforting for political
leaders and voters who cannot make up their minds on the policies they
wish to follow. It does not, however, respond to society's need for real
solutions to concrete problems or fulfill the duty of government or the
legal profession to develop a procedural scheme that preserves funda-
mental constitutional values and real democratic choice. To paraphrase
an enemy of constitutional democracy, law becomes a political opiate for
those acting under the illusion of judicialization.
One especially important effect of the fallacy of judicialization on
current administrative law theory is manifested in the confusion of two
radically different aspects of public government-that is, of public deci-
sionmaking. The first involves decisions of will. We generally refer to
these decisions as "political" or "democratic" or "policy" decisions. The
second mode is based on decisions of logic. These are decisions that we
generally describe as "legal" or "judicial." Despite the inevitable over-
lap, these two classes of decisions have very different characteristics. De-
cisions of will typically are subjective. There is often no "right" answer
to the problem calling for such a decision. A classic, albeit homely, ex-
ample is whether the fence around the city hall should be painted blue or
white. We summarize this concept by the term "discretion." The prem-
ise behind decisions of logic, on the other hand, is that they are objective,
at least within a given culture or legal system. With respect to decisions
of this second type, typically there will be one answer that will be found
to be the most consistent with a given social reality. A simple example is
the determination whether a particular person has reached the eight-
eenth-year age threshold that would allow him to vote. The inquiry will
be based upon factors totally unrelated to thoughts about whether it
would be nice or nasty for that person to be a voter. A person has a right
to vote if he is eighteen and does not have that right if he is not eighteen;
the task is to decide if a particular individual meets that criterion. Such a
decisionmaking process does not depend upon an exercise of will or sub-
jective judgment. The age threshhold is taken as a given and applied
[Vol. 1985:427
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deductively, and, of course, the unexamined premise of what is the
"best" minimum age for voters is based on a previously made decision of
will.
Both types of decisions have their appropriate places in our polity.
However, because they are functionally different at a fundamental level,
it is to be expected that the methods and institutions appropriate for one
type of decisionmaking will be highly inappropriate for the other type.
Likewise, one could infer that the subject matter fit for decisions of
will-what color to paint the fence, for example-cannot be properly ad-
dressed by the other mode. The "right" color cannot be selected by a
computer program-or by any other set of purely logical procedures. A
confusion of these two types of decisions and their attendant processes is
dysfunctional and endangers both the constitutional framework and op-
erational efficiency of government. 7
In fact, a significant confusion of the modes of governmental deci-
sionmaking has occurred in our system. This confusion is an effect of the
judicialization fallacy and manifests itself in an overvaluation of the deci-
sion of logic in the public policy arena and the concomitant overvalua-
tion of that type of decisionmaking's optimal institution, the fully
proceduralized court. The corollary of this trend has been the underval-
uation of the decision of will, which does not appear to have an optimal
institutional form. Although the sole administrator, with total discretion
within the limits of the agency's mandate, is a prime example of an insti-
tution designed for making decisions of will, the traditional New Eng-
land town meeting is an equally valid model, as is the referendum.
However, these models can only approximate the archetype of the deci-
sion of will, which is the individual acting in a private capacity. Thus,
perhaps, government always has a bias toward the decision of logic. It is,
after all, the type of decision most consistent with the collective character
of government, while the decision of will is in its purest form a private
act.8 In democratic constitutionalism, however, both decisionmaking
7. Separation of these two types of decisionmaking powers serves to balance the will of the
majority against the rights of individuals.
[Tihere is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and execu-
tive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the execu-
tive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRrr OF THE LAWS 152 (T. Nugent trans. 1949) (bk. XI). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) (discussion of the separation of powers provided for by the United
States Constitution). See Horowitz, supra note 2, at 151-54, for a discussion focused specifically on
the inadequacy of the judicial decisionmaking process for making policy determinations.
8. In certain ancient civilizations, there was no distinction made between the law and the
private will of the deified ruler. But as societies grew more complex, the dichotomy between govern-
ment and the private will of those who govern became an essential part of political and legal theory.
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modes are necessary, and the balance between them affects the health of
the body politic.
And even if there is an inherent bias in governments toward the
decision of logic and away from that of will, it still is important to ask
why this tendency seemingly has been exaggerated in the course of the
last generation. Why has this relatively recent trend overvalued the type
of decisions produced by the judicial structure? Perhaps more impor-
tantly, in what ways has this bias manifested itself, and what have been
the effects on the functioning of government and the direction of public
policy? And finally, what are the alternatives to an overly judicialized
governmental system? I would like to offer some thoughts on these is-
sues in the context of the federal government. But this is not to say that
the problem is confined to the national part of our constitutional system.
Preliminary readings on the debate in the states on the subject of the
legislative veto and some studies of specific state regulatory processes
strongly indicate that the problem is very real at that level as well. 9
I. THE DYSFUNCTION IN CONTEXT
To analyze the seductiveness of the judicial model of public deci-
sionmaking, and its effect on the federal system, one has to look to the
origins of American administrative law. More than one scholar has
See generally E. VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS 27-75 (1952). The basic issues raised
by this dichotomy are still with us today. Although we are committed to a presidency closely cir-
cumscribed by law, we also yearn for a president who has all the wisdom, compassion, energy,
courage, and leadership humanly possible. The "strong-president" debate is a key theme in our
politics, and can be seen as but one example of our desire to import into our government more
effective institutions for making decisions of will.
9. See generally, eg., LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION COMM., NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESTORING THE BALANCE (1979) (recom-
mending legislative review of administrative regulations); M. PRICE, EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF
RULEMAKING: THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CALIFORNIA (1980) (report prepared for
and published by the Administrative Conference of the U.S.); Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative
Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, The Rulemak-
ing Process, 60 IOWA L. REv. 731 (1975); Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in
Indiana: I, 28 IND. L.. 1 (1952); Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administra-
tive Agencies" Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982) (an examination of the
use of the legislative veto in various states, concluding that it should not be used); Schotland, Judi-
cial Review of State Administrative Action, 26 AD. L. REv. 93 (1974) (arguing for increased educa-
tion of state judges on the subject of administrative law); Taylor, Legislative Vetoes and the
Massachusetts Separation of Powers Doctrine, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1979) (concluding that a
legislative veto of executive action violates the Massachusetts Constitution). See also the reports
prepared by the staff of the New York State Assembly's Administrative Regulations Review Com-
mission: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING (1977); PUBLIC ACCESS TO
RULEMAKING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACTS (1978); STATE AGENCIES AND THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: A
STUDY OF COMPLIANCE (1977).
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noted that administrative law in the broadest sense dates from the incep-
tion of the nation; 0 to the extent that one defines administrative law as
the control of government administration by general legal principles, ad-
ministrative law is a necessary aspect of constitutional government. It is
more useful, however, to view administrative law as a comprehensive sys-
tem of specific legal rules and judicial precedents governing the way gov-
ernment makes decisions affecting the private rights of individuals. Even
under this narrower definition one can find examples of administrative
law dating back to the earliest days of the Republic,11 and before that to
the jurisprudence of England. 12 But it was not until the latter part of the
nineteenth century that the federal government began to have a major
impact upon the private rights of individuals. Government intervention
into the sphere of private rights increased dramatically during and fol-
lowing the War Between the States, 13 and the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) in 188714 marked a symbolic turning
point in the evolutionary process. In the ICC, the first of the independ-
ent regulatory agencies, we find the model for ongoing federal institu-
tional involvement with private rights.15 It was this historical
10. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6-7 (1977); J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 5 n.5 (1927); W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 4-5 (1941).
11. See, eg., W. GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 4-7 (regulation of oceangoing vessels, the coastal
trade, and customs); E. FREUND, R. FLETCHER, J. DAVIES, C. POUND, J. KURTZ & C. NAGEL,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 16-20 (1923); see also 0. HANDLIN & M.
HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861, at 229-44 (rev. ed. 1969) (discussing the "reform state").
12. See W. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 189 (8th ed. 1915); F. GooDNow, COM-
PARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6-7 (1893); see generally E. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1963) (an examination of the relationship between the courts and
administrative bodies in the 1600's).
13. To take but one example-and setting to one side the enormous powers appropriated by the
President during the Civil War and by Congress in subsequently encouraging the growth of railroads
and other business schemes-the civil rights measures enacted during Reconstruction to protect the
rights of freedmen drastically extended the reach of the federal government. In vetoing one such act,
President Andrew Johnson characterized it as establishing safeguards "'which go infinitely beyond
any that the General Government has ever provided'" and as "'an absorption and assumption of
power by the General Government which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative
system of limited powers."' E. McKrrRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 315
(1960); see also K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 112, 132 (1965). While
these new powers were not then utilized in the area of what we think of as administrative law, and
not utilized at that time as extensively as in later years, the mere fact that President Johnson's vetoes
were overriden so readily indicated a new, radically different mindset about the role of the federal
government in our national life.
14. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
15. See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4, 14 (1968). Traditionally, stu-
dents of administrative law have been fascinated with and focused their attention on the workings of
the independent regulatory agencies. See, eg., B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF
GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 26-29 (1972).
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development that necessitated the creation of an explicit and coherent set
of judicial and legislative principles out of which the fabric of modem
administrative law has been woven. Our inquiry into the present state of
administrative law might benefit, therefore, by a glance at the context in
which this system began.
There were several general reasons put forward for the creation of
the ICC, and analogs to them recur with respect to the numerous other
independent regulatory boards and commissions that later followed its
pattern. 16 These reasons seem to me to be directly relevant to the issues
raised by the coexistence of the two fundamentally different types of gov-
ernmental decisionmaking described earlier. At the core of the underly-
ing rationale was a political critique of the free market's ability "fairly"
to set prices in certain areas of the economy. 17 In the case of the ICC, of
course, the concern was railroad rates. But it must be remembered that
this view was put forward in the context of a general social commitment
to private economic freedom.18 The political theory of the proponents of
economic regulation was that monopolistic conditions prevailed in the
railroad industry, or at least that railroads possessed disproportionate
bargaining power relative to shippers.1 9 For their part, the shipping in-
terests had vastly superior voting power at their command. These were
the factors that, in part, supplied the political justification for govern-
mental intervention in favor of the shippers. Of course, this debate grew
out of a much broader political controversy that pitted different eco-
nomic interests and geographic regions against one another.20 All in all,
it was a classic battle of will.
The ultimate outcome of this battle could have been any of a
number of possible political solutions: government seizure and owner-
16. B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, supra note 15, at 27-29; see generally M. BERNSTEIN, REGU-
LATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REG-
ULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941); A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION (1971).
17. See D. BoLEs & P. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 50-60 (1977).
18. Id. Cf. In re Consolidations and Combinations of Carriers, and Communities of Interest
Therein, Their Rates, Facilities and Practices, 12 I.C.C. 277, 305 (1907) ("competition between
railways as well as between other industries is the established policy of the nation").
19. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 13
(1979); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW chs. 9-12 (2d ed. 1977); B. WEISBROD, J. HAN-
DLER, & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
ch. 2 (1978).
20. The political explanation for the creation of the ICC and the motives of the various interest
groups involved have been the subject of considerable controversy. See, e.g., D. BOLES & P.
VERKUIL, supra note 17, at 17-25, 56-63; S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 19, at 23-24; S.
BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT 11-15 (1913). See generally G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REG-
ULATION (1965) (historical overview); I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
(1931) (detailed multi-volume history); Purcell, Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate
Commerce Act, 54 J. AM. HIST. 561 (1967).
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ship of the railroads; the creation of private causes of action against rail-
roads for unfair rates; the elimination of certain market imperfections
such as the government grants to the railroads; no action by government;
or the actual solution of government regulation. Regulation was perhaps
the most likely result because at its heart it is a political rather than an
economic or legal approach, and one consistent in theory with the con-
cept of police power known to the English polity and common law for so
long.21 Regulation also represents the thing politicians like most in this
imperfect world-a compromise. The very premise of regulation is that
private decisionmaking is generally good, but needs government controls
to make it better. Why else do we regulate rather than take over or leave
alone? In fact, regulation is a necessarily imperfect compromise on the
most basic political question any society must answer: what is the proper
sphere of the state and the proper sphere of the individual? Regulation
always ultimately rests upon this intellectual compromise-even though
the compromise might be criticized as philosophical quicksand. Inherent
in this shifting foundation is the host of problems that are the province of
administrative law. Inherent also is a struggle between majorities and
minorities, that is, between those favoring decisions of will and those
favoring decisions of logic.
Several important concepts that underpin current administrative
law can be found in the theory and structure of the independent regula-
tory agency. First, there is the need to justify government intervention in
the face of the American constitutional norm of freedom. Historically,
monopoly has been the most significant of these justifications.22 Other
justifications include the ignorance of users and purchasers of goods and
services with respect to complex or technical issues,23 the perceived rapa-
21. See, eg., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *263-68, *415-16 (describing the King's
"prerogatives" as "arbiter of [domestic] commerce" and a statute restricting the practice of trades to
those persons who have served as apprentices).
22. Prior to 1920, economic regulation was aimed primarily at preventing monopoly abuses.
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209 (1890), the Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), were all directed at problems associated with concen-
trated economic power. However, the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, ushered in a
new era of regulation that attempted to manage industries in the "public interest," protecting both
established firms and the public from abusive practices or other problems created by too much com-
petition. See Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016, 1026-28 (1971).
23. The Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), is an early example of regulation designed to
protect consumers from hazards they cannot be expected to uncover themselves. See J. WILSON,
THE POLrrcs OF REGULATION 192-201 (1980). A more recent example is the Consumer Product
Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
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cious nature of certain industries,24 and the need for a comprehensive
national regulatory scheme that a common law system, working alone,
would be unable to achieve.25 It is essential to consider these underlying
political justifications for establishing regulatory bodies when evaluating
the appropriate locus and nature of decisionmaking functions within
such governmental programs. This is so because in our constitutional
system the permissible uses of and limitations upon a power are directly
related to if not dependent upon the rationale for the legislature's
action.26
What should be noted about these justifications for government in-
tervention is that they are all premised on the need to exert governmental
power in favor of certain values. Governmental power aids competition,
collective bargaining, the flow of information, automobile safety, and so
on. But this means that government must make decisions of will that run
counter to the decisions of will-the values-of many citizens. By im-
posing automobile safety standards, for example, government favors the
values of consumers who want safer cars over those who want cheaper or
faster cars. Whatever one may think of this policy, it is just that, a pol-
icy, an act of political will that does not involve questions of "rights." It
may in fact create or destroy rights, but it is not a decision about rights.
A policy decision such as one on automobile safety standards is not
a decision of logic, but it can be made to appear so by arguing that it is a
decision mandated by a concern for individual rights. The argument
goes something like this: Government has a duty to protect the rights of
its citizens; unsafe cars threaten to kill or injure individuals other than
24. Regulation of the securities markets following the collapse of the stock market in 1929 falls
into this category.
25. E.g., The Wagner Act, ch. 117, 46 Stat. 1084 (1931) (providing for the planning and con-
struction of public works, industrial stabilization, and the alleviation of unemployment) (the Na-
tional Resources Planning Board was abolished by Act of June 26, 1943, ch. 145, tit. I, 57 Stat. 169,
170, rendering the Wagner Act obsolete; certain provisions were formally repealed in 1966); Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Early regulation of the communications
industry and the safety aspects of common carrier regulation are other examples of national regula-
tory schemes. Constitutional limitations upon the courts and practical limitations on the Congress
made executive branch regulation necessary to establish national standards in these areas.
26. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819):
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its
limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution
must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to per-
form the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
On the current status of constitutional scrutiny of legislative actions affecting the economy, see the
debate between Judge Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703 (1985), and Profes-
sor Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CA'TO J. 711 (1985).
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those who voluntarily purchased them, and additional costs are imposed
upon society in the form of higher automobile and medical insurance
rates, all because of technical defects in the less safe cars; therefore, gov-
ernment must take action to protect the "rights" of all drivers and insur-
ance-premium payers by imposing stringent safety standards. The
fallacy in this syllogism lies in the concept of "rights" that it implies. So
broad a notion of rights would require the state to protect its citizens
from all preventable harm, and that in turn would require it to abrogate
freedoms whenever necessary to achieve that end. Under such a concep-
tual approach, freedom would be an essentially meaningless notion be-
cause all freedom can potentially harm other human beings. If "rights"
and policy are confused in this way, it can be argued that restrictive gov-
ernment power must always be exercised when the potential harm posed
by freedom becomes significant to any degree.
I am not necessarily arguing against the use of the power of the state
for the purpose of aiding certain values. That is a question involving
prudence in the Burkean sense.2 7 It is, however, critical to understand
that when such power is used it is an act of political will the sources of
which cannot be found in a theory of rights. Each such act of will must
be justifiable in terms of the values of the society as expressed in its con-
stitution and, when constitutionally permissible, the society's political
and economic goals, and the resulting action's efficaciousness.
A second important underpinning of our system of administrative
law is the notion of procedural due process as a necessary check upon the
implementation of majoritarian political decisions by means of adminis-
trative action.2 8 Historically, this limitation was conceived of as a liber-
tarian device.29 If, in the name of certain political goals, government was
to intrude upon what had traditionally been recognized as individual
rights at the very heart of our constitutional trinity of life, liberty, and
property, then our Constitution seemed to mandate some protection of
these minority rights. If freedom had to be limited, it should not be
trampled. The traditional means of such protection are, of course, the
courts. It has been the courts' historic role to confine executive agents to
their statutory charters and the statutory charters to their constitutional
27. "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays
instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion." E. BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol,
in EDMUND BURKE ON GOVERNMENT, POLITIcs AND SOCIETY 157 (B. Hill ed. 1976).
28. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Proces" Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1524-27 (1975).
29. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1311-15.
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bases.30 With specific reference to the regulation of private economic
rights, however, reliance on constitutional protection was largely over-
thrown in the late 1930's by the demise of substantive due process re-
view31 and an expansive reinterpretation of the commerce clause. 32 In
reaction to the significant governmental growth ushered in by this
change in judicial philosophy, the New Deal programs, and World War
II, and as a countermeasure to widely perceived agency overreaching, the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 33 was enacted in 1946. The APA
seemed to provide the political system with yet another form of compro-
mise, one which protected private rights from obviously arbitrary and
uninformed administrative actions directed against them. 34
A serious systemic problem of constitutional proportions in the ex-
ecutive branch was noted at the very heyday of the New Deal. Reporting
in 1937, a committee set up by 'President Roosevelt observed that the
"Executive Branch of the Government of the United States has . . .
grown up without plan or design like the barns, shacks, silos, tool sheds,
and garages of an old farm. To look at it now, no one would ever recog-
nize the structure which the founding fathers erected a century and a half
ago." 35
[The independent regulatory commissions] have been the result of leg-
islative groping rather than the pursuit of a consistent policy....
. . . They are in reality miniature independent governments set
up to deal with the railroad problem, the banking problem, or the ra-
30. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320-94 (1965);
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195-99 (1952) (dis-
cussion of the history and nature of federal judicial review of legislative action).
31. See, e-g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-51 (1978) (tracing the development of substantive due process
review of economic legislation from the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), to
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and through the latter case's decline in the late 1930's).
32. See, eg., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Stem, The Commerce Clause and
the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946); see also Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 432 (1982); Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too
Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981).
Cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985)
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had provided the states'
"traditional" governmental functions with immunity from commerce clause legislation).
33. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305,
3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1982)).
34. For a summary of the events leading up to the passage of the Administrative Procedure
Act, see Burchell, The Administrative Procedure Act, 22 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 375, 375-79 (1955); Verkuil,
supra note 3, at 261-76.
35. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (1937).
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dio problem. They constitute a headless "fourth branch" of the Gov-
ernment, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and
uncoordinated powers....
...There is a conflict of principle involved in their make-up and
functions. . . . [T]hey are vested with duties of administration and
policy determination. . ., and at the same time they are given impor-
tant judicial work ....
The evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious
and far reaching ...
• ..Pressures and influences properly enough directed toward of-
ficers responsible for formulating and administering policy constitute
an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights.
But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these sub-
versive influences impossible.
Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecu-
tors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weak-
ens public confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting
private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationaliza-
tions of the preliminary findings which the commission, in the role of
prosecutor, presented to it self [sic]. 36
It can be argued with some force that the APA was designed to deal
with this systemic problem by creating a logical allocation between deci-
sions of will and decisions of logic. The majoritarian decision of will to
regulate rates in the railroad industry, for example, should at the mini-
mum allow the affected parties to argue their case to the body politic, if
not on the broad policy question of whether government ratemaking is
proper, then at least on the subsidiary question whether a specific rate
established by the ICC is reasonable. 37 What is sometimes not fully rec-
ognized is that this political compromise gives only limited protection to
the affected private individuals. All that the APA was intended to guar-
antee is a "right" to a "fair" hearing, not a "fair" result. However, by
virtue of this right to a hearing the affected parties have the opportunity
to fight for a "fair" substantive result before the ICC, a political body
with a membership and values shaped by elected presidents, and budgets
and substantive policies shaped by elected congresses.
One final notion of critical importance to understanding current ad-
ministrative law theory and practice is the concept of independent exper-
tise.3s No concept in our constitutional system has been both so
36. Id. at 39-40. It should be noted, however, that the problems of federal bureaucracy ante-
dated the New Deal, as illustrated by J. BECK, OUR WONDERLAND OF BUREAUCRACY (1932).
37. See generally Morgan, Toward a Revised Strategy for Ratemaking, 78 U. ILL. L. F. 21
(1978), for a detailed discussion of ratemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.
38. Agency expertise is generally thought to be applicable to procedural as well as substantive
issues. In FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), Chief Justice Warren referred to "the con-
gressional determination that administrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with the
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important and at the same time so ill thought out over the last half-
century as the role of the expert in public decisionmaking. We began the
modem era with an almost unbounded faith in the ability of scientific
and other kinds of experts to set the world right. Neither the Great War
nor the Great Depression shook this faith significantly. The new admin-
istrative bodies that sprang up from the teens to the late thirties were
evidence of a belief on the part of our society that technical expertise had
a critical role to play in administrative decisionmaking. Specialized
agencies headed by single administrators or collegial boards with staffs of
technical experts were set up to regulate airlines, communications, foods
and drugs, and power facilities. Other expert agencies were thought nec-
essary to deal with securities, monetary policy, labor relations, trade
practices, and various other specialized areas. Although the post-World
War II era and the advent of nuclear weapons no doubt tarnished soci-
ety's faith in expertise as an ultimate solution, reliance on experts contin-
ued to increase. Product safety, environmental concerns, commercial
nuclear power, commodities markets, automobiles, race relations, work-
place conditions, and other areas of significant public concern were all
brought within the ambit of the decisionmaking power of expert adminis-
trative agencies. 39
But the traumatic social and political events of the last half of the
1960's and first half of the 1970's-Vietnam and Watergate-contributed
to a new and more serious reaction against the role of experts, a reaction
that formed a part of a larger feeling of distrust of government. The
American people began to doubt that expertise alone guaranteed sound
social decisions. In fact, experts began to be perceived as part of the
industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than federal courts or Congress itself
to design procedural rules adapted to the pecularities of the industry and the tasks of the agency
involved." (quoted with approval in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978)). See also ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrrTEE ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc.
No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 15, 19 (1941).
39. See, eg., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (amending the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 and establishing the Atomic Energy Commission, which was
abolished in 1974, at which time most of its functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, §§ 104, 201-209, 88 Stat.
1233, 1237-38, 1242-48); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (establishing the
Commission on Civil Rights); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 83-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241,
253-66 (establishing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (establishing the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health); Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (establishing the Consumer
Product Safety Commission); Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-463, 88 Stat. 1389.
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problem rather than sources of solutions.4° Just as it has been said that
war is too important to be left to the generals, significant sectors of the
body politic began to suggest that nuclear power was too important to be
left to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that broadcast license deci-
sions were too important to be left to the Federal Communications Com-
mission, and that pesticide control decisions were too important to be left
to the United States Department of Agriculture. The response at the
political level was not, however, to remove the experts from the decision-
making process, or even to clarify and define the kind of expert decision-
making the agencies should freely engage in. In part, this was because
our faith in expertise was and is still quite strong. It was also because the
institutional and legislative constituencies for expertise were quite strong
and firmly entrenched in the governmental machine. Thus, instead, the
remedy was to introduce other parties and other factors into the adminis-
trative process.
In general, three additional categories of controls were overlaid onto
existing administrative structures, controls not derived from fundamental
due process requirements, but put forward as a means of substantively
improving agency decisions. The first of these provided for the involve-
ment of new participants in the making and applying of regulations. Ex-
panded standing to challenge rules and rulings41 and requirements for
public input and participation in more and more agency matters42 are
manifestations of this trend. Next came a variety of general procedural
requirements intended to "open up the process" by creating a kind of
general public record. Statutes like the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),43 the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),44 the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act (FACA),45 the Privacy Act,4 6 the Govern-
40. Cf C. CERF & V. NAVASKY, THE EXPERTS SPEAK: THE DEFINITIVE COMPENDIUM OF
AUTHORITATIVE MISINFORMATION (1984) (a humorous collection of expert misinformation on a
variety of subjects).
41. See, eg., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966); see generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH
CONG., lST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION Vol. III, ch. 3 (Comm. Print 1977).
42. For a discussion of the extent of public participation in regulatory proceedings and of pro-
posals to facilitate public participation, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS, vol. III, ch. 3 (Comm. Print
1977). See also Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 2, which is an attempt to develop a general theory of
private rights in public programs.
43. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
44. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(1982)).
45. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. app. 979-86
(1982)).
46. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
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ment in the Sunshine Act,47 and the Ethics in Government Act48 all have
as one of their main purposes the making available to special interest
groups and members of the general public alike information that would
allow them to keep abreast of-and so potentially participate in-the de-
liberations of the expert bodies. The third and most recent development
has been the attempt to craft interbranch controls-general in form, but
capable of specific application-over the decisions of the agencies. The
legislative veto,4 9 the executive rule review function performed by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB),50 and the provisions for ex-
panded judicial scrutiny of agency decisions embodied in the proposed
Bumpers amendment 51 are the most important examples of this latter
group. In recent years, each of these interbranch control devices has re-
ceived extensive treatment in legislative hearings,52 in the law journals,5 3
at specialized conferences,54 and in public policy literature generally.
47. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552,
552b, 556-557, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 at 983, 39 U.S.C. § 410 (1982)).
48. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified, as amended, at 2 U.S.C. §§ 118a, 288-
288m, 701-709, 5 U.S.C. § 5316, 5 U.S.C. app. at 1005-06, 18 U.S.C. § 207, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 528-
529, 591-598, 1364, 28 U.S.C. app. at 427-35, 39 U.S.C. §§ 3210, 3216, 3219 (1982)).
49. The Supreme Court held the legislative veto to be unconstitutional in Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). For a general discussion of alternatives to the
legislative veto, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LEGISLATIVE VETO OF AGENCY
RULES AFTER INS v CHADHA (1984); see also CONG. RES. SERVICE, STUDIES ON THE LEGISLA-
TIVE VETO (Comm. Print 1980) (studies commissioned by the House Committee on Rules).
50. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1035 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 (1982).
51. The term "Bumpers amendment" has been applied to various forms of legislative proposals
that would eliminate any presumption of validity of agency rules. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.81-2 (1984)
(preamble to Recommendation 81-2 of the Administrative Conference of the U.S., "Current Ver-
sions of the Bumpers Amendment"); Levin, Judicial Review and the Bumpers Amendment, in FED-
ERAL BAR ASS'N, CURRENT ISSUES AND REGULATORY REFORM 264 (M. Rosenberg & B.
McGovern eds. 1980).
52. See, eg., Office of Management and Budget Control of OSHA Rulemaking, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing of the House Comm on Govt. Operations, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982). Hearings on the legislative veto include Congressional Review ofAgency Rules, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Constitutional Amendment to Restore Legislative Veto, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1984); Legislative Veto After Chadha, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Rules, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984).
53. See, eg., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control ofAdministrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Levin, Review of "Jurisdictional" Issues Under the
Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L.J. 355; Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of
Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982); Note, The
Decline of the One-House Veto after Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service and Consumer
Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 943
(1983).
54. E-g., Legislative Veto of Agency Rules after INS v. Chadha, agenda item at the Twenty-
Seventh Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference of the United States, held at Washington,
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There is no reason to rehearse that commentary here. However, it is
important to note the collective and cumulative effect that all of these
developments--expanded standing and participation, the creation of a
general public record, and interbranch controls-have had on the devel-
opment of administrative law, and this aspect of the subject has received
surprisingly scant attention.
These various attempts to assert greater control over the agencies
are a symptom that our political system is deeply troubled by the current
process by which administrative decisions are made. In part, the misgiv-
ing is directed at the specialized and hence compartmentalized nature of
current administrative decisionmaking. Decisions that may have an ef-
fect upon the whole of society are being made by bodies with an alleged
competence in only specialized sectors,55 and that alleged competence is,
of course, under attack even within the agencies' areas of expert jurisdic-
tion.56 The push for greater and more effective private, legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial oversight is also a reflection of a strong feeling on the
part of Americans that their government is just too big and too intrusive
in an absolute sense. This perception of excessive size and complexity is
reinforced by the fact that, whatever the benefits of governmental ac-
tions, they are purchased at an extremely high economic and social cost.
And, finally, it cannot be doubted that additional controls seem desirable
because there is a significant lack of social consensus as to the solutions
to the difficult problems facing our society. There is a delicate balancing
of values involved in crafting those solutions. People want safer and
cheaper products. They want cleaner air without any loss of jobs in
D.C. (Dec. 15, 1983) (proceedings published by the Administrative Conference, see supra note 49);
Conference on the Implications of Executive Order 12,291 for Environmental Policy, held at Chapel
Hill, N.C. (Oct. 11-12, 1982).
55. Gerald E. Frug compares the "expertise model" of agency operation to that of corporate
management: "[J]ust as shareholders can comfortably defer to management's business judgment
concerning the essential issues of corporate governance, citizens can legitimately accept the decisions
of a particular government agency on matters within its expertise." Frug, The Ideology of Bureau-
cracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1277, 1320 (1984).
56. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.6, 2.13 (2d ed. 1978); L. JAFFE,
supra note 30, at 576-85; and Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
372-81 (1978), for examples of the proposition that the application of agency expertise must be
overseen by the courts. In discussing "Expert Administration and Democracy," Justice Frankfurter
observed that "protection" against abuses of "the power which might more and more be lodged in
administrative experts" must be both procedural and political:
[W]hile expert administrators may sift out issues, elucidate them, bring the light of fact and
experience to bear upon them, the final determinations of large policy must be made by the
direct representatives of the public and not by the experts.. . . In the final analysis, we are
in the realm of judgment regarding values as to which there is as yet no voice of science.
The very notion of democracy implies the right of the public to decide these matters on its
own choice.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 157-60 (1930).
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heavy industry. They want economic growth, but not industrial or com-
mercial development of the areas where they live and play.57 Many of
these competing desires can be harmonized by compromise. But very
few of them can be resolved in such a way as to satisfy completely all the
diverse interests that are implicated. Moreover, at the margins, where
most of the critical governmental decisions occur, there is far less chance
of harmony. Consequently, there is often a reluctance on the part of the
political system-in any of its manifestations-to actually make the diffi-
cult decisions.
Against this background, the administrative process in the mid-
1980's is caught in the following crosscurrents. On the one hand, a deep
and real concern with the way in which administrative decisions are
made is felt by the advocates of more governmental intervention. They
distrust the agencies because they view them as being too concerned with
the rights of the private interests that are the object of regulation.58
Thinkers of this school find a solution in more regulation and more as-
surances that the regulators are operating "effectively." On the other
hand, an equally deep and real concern is felt by opponents of govern-
ment intervention, who distrust the agencies because, to these people, the
regulatory bodies are too bureaucratic and unresponsive 59-and some-
times overzealous.60 The solution proposed by this second group is to
limit the ability of the agencies to impose their view of economic and
social reality upon the economy and society at large. These diametrically
opposed attitudes6' converge in a chimerical desire to impose "objec-
tive," non-political limits on the administrative system. The goals of
57. Several of these self-contradictory social goals are explored in R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS,
REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 36-58 (1983), reviewed in Diver, Book Review: Regulating the
Regulators, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1243 (1984).
58. See generally P. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
(1981), reviewed in 81 MICH. L. REv. 1096 (1983).
59. Bil Gilbert, in Alone in the Wilderness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 3, 1983, at 96, 102-03,
attacks the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior in this vein. Even agency
heads have been known to characterize their own organizations as "unresponsive bureaucraclies]."
See The David Who's Now the TA Goliath, 10 NAT'L J. 1208 (1978) (remark about the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) attributed to S. David Freeman, who had been appointed Chairman of the
TVA in May, 1978).
60. "The 1980 FTC authorization included a number of restrictions on the agency. FTC critics
said the measures were necessary to rein in an overzealous regulatory agency. . . . Supporters of
the FTC contended that the agency was simply doing its job of protecting consumers and companies
.... " Sarasohn, Action Expected After Elections" Restraints on FTC Extended Pending New Au.
thorization, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2637 (1982).
61. There is, of course, a "middle ground" that rejects both extremes and argues instead that a
certain quality of life needs to be guaranteed by government, and that this should be the proper focus
of political thinking. See S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVEs? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT (1981). But it is not at all clear that moderate views can prevail irl the crossfire generated
by the extreme positions.
[Vol. 1985:427
COMMENTAR Y
either position involve a change in the very reason why the administra-
tive process as we know it developed. The pro-regulatory view seeks to
commandeer the process for its own ideological purposes by limiting ad-
ministrative discretion to the minimum and making major changes in
policy direction very difficult. Advocates of deregulation seek to mini-
mize the interventionist damage by erecting numerous hurdles to the
process of rulemaking and administrative adjudication. Both goals natu-
rally lead to the one institution most capable of slowing down and re-
stricting administrative action: the court.
Law is restraint. It ultimately operates by force. Although in a
healthy and free society a consensus on legitimacy makes explicit reliance
upon force the exception rather than the norm, the use of some form of
sanction-such as the withholding of government benefits-is necessary
to make law effective. This necessary operational mode of law defines
what law can and what it cannot do. You can do many things by threat
or promise, but you cannot create or invent by that method. It is un-
doubtedly true that through threats or promises, creativity and invention
can be stimulated, though not in predictable ways. Witness, for example,
the creative welfare fraud schemes which have arisen in response to those
well-intentioned laws, or the manipulation of grant and tax laws by crea-
tive lawyers and accountants to achieve ends never dreamed of by the
legislators. A law cannot mandate a work of art, an invention, or a new
approach to business or social relationships. Although the law at its best
may channel human creativity by restricting some types of conduct and
encouraging and underwriting others, and by reducing the threats to
human freedom that may stifle creativity, its essential nature is wonder-
fully biased to restricting actions. Creativity and invention can spring
only from the individual human mind, while law operates at the level of
society.
In the political branches of government, action usually takes the
form of law-rules, orders, decisions, exceptions. The substance of gov-
ernment action, however, can and often does resemble the actions of a
private person. For example, when our government builds a space shut-
tle, it harnesses the creative energy of individual scientists, engineers,
technicians, administrators, and astronauts in an act of human will and
creativity. Statutes, regulations, and even adjudication are involved, but
they are not the essence of the act. The courts, however, unlike the exec-
utive or legislative branches, can act only within the mode of law. Judi-
cial acts are-or should be-purely legal in character. Thus, while
political bodies have the potential to be creative, courts must always be
instruments of restraint. The judicial function begins where the demo-
cratically-controlled process of policy formation ends. As the monitors
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of internal consistency in matters of interpretation, procedure, and en-
forcement, the courts can be said to deal exclusively with restricting the
end product of the political system, and their decisionmaking apparatus
is admirably suited to this task. That apparatus is seriously defective in
the sphere of policymaking, just as the art of crafting policy decisions is
wholly inconsistent with the function of the court.
While the courtroom may be the stage of history at times, it is no
more suited for this role than the battlefield or the convention hall are fit
places to try a legal case. Lawyers often want great public debates re-
solved in the judicial forum: it is exciting and ennobling to the legal pro-
fession. But that is not the proper role of the courts, and to the degree
that the legal system becomes the arbiter of public policy it fails its
unique trust to society. Lawyers, as trustees of our legal system, must
not use that system to impose their clients' political will, or their own, on
society at large. When they want to play that game they must change
roles and do it as policymakers or politicians.
Nevertheless, today we are faced with a governmental system that
has greatly overvalued, and hence overemphasized, the kind of decisions
that can be made by means of the judicial process-decisions of logic.
The embracing of the judicial model has been to the detriment of the
kind of decisions made by individuals possessing administrative discre-
tion derived from a popular or political mandate-decisions of will. This
change has come about in part because there has been a failure of confi-
dence in the quality of government administrators and their administra-
tive decisions. More fundamentally, there has developed a distrust of the
political process as a means of making the important decisions affecting
our society and our very lives. Reacting against the output of the admin-
istrative state, we have been led to believe that the judicial process and its
procedures, and their promise of insulation from at least some types of
political pressure, are the answer to this crisis of confidence.
The failings of some regulatory and administrative officials, the lim-
ited resources of agencies, the slowness of the bureaucratic process, the
uncertainties inherent in technical standards and the studies that pro-
duced them, and the conflicts of interest that sometimes seem to affect
government fact-finding and policy determinations, all appear, in our
current social mythology, to have an appealing solution in the judicial
process. 62 This mythology tends to idealize the independent legal gener-
62. See, eg., Confidence in Institutions, THE GALLUP REPORT, Oct. 1983, at 3, 3-4, 8 (public
confidence in the United States Supreme Court approximately the same in 1983 as in 1973, while
confidence in Congress markedly declined during the same period); see generally S. LiPSET & W.
SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP 13-81 (1983). But see Harris, Confidence in Institutions Rises
Sharply, THE HARRIS SURVEY, Dec. 17, 1984, at 1, 1-2 (public confidence in the United States
446 ["Vol. 1985:427
COMMENTARY
alist in the black robes as one who always makes objective decisions "on
the record" in accordance with a strict protocol designed to ferret out the
truth and arrive at a just result. Of course, the very nature of the matters
typically brought to the courtroom for resolution, and the way they are
structured by the litigation process, go a long way toward assuring a
measure of success. We often forget this, however, and assume that the
specialized qualities of the judge and the judicial process can be applied
in other settings with equally effective results.
And there are other reasons why the judicial model is so alluring.
Traditionally, the courts have functioned as protectors of property and
due process rights, and this can be expected to lead some to regard them
as a primary line of defense against the interventionist state. On the
other side, pro-regulation and other constituencies without current polit-
ical "clout" naturally come to the one non-majoritarian branch of the
federal system. Some have seen in contemporary judicial activism a nat-
ural extension of the nineteenth-century common law tradition, with cur-
rent beneficiaries of government programs the natural heirs of those who
used the courts to keep government and private individuals from infring-
ing upon their liberty and property. 63 And, finally, those who still con-
sider expert decisionmaking to be the answer to our social problems find
a better model in the professional judge than in the ultra-pluralistic legis-
lative and executive branches. Before looking at alternative ways of deal-
ing with this widespread mistrust of the political decisionmaking
process-that is, before considering alternatives to increased judicializa-
tion-the concrete operation of the current overvaluation and overem-
phasis of the judicial decisionmaking model should be examined.
II. CAUSES AND EFFECTS
We should first note the many political controls, both formal and
informal, that already operate in the administrative system. The various
departments, boards, commissions, committees, administrations, govern-
ment corporations, offices, conferences, and agencies" are each headed
by a politically accountable official reporting to either the President or
Supreme Court was approximately the same in 1984 as in 1983 and 1973; confidence in Congress
was approximately the same in 1983 as in 1974, but increased somewhat between 1983 and 1984,
although still below the level associated with the Supreme Court; public confidence in the White
House was approximately the same in 1983 as in 1973, but increased dramatically in 1984-so as to
surpass the level of confidence in the Court); Field, California Public Has Considerable Doubts About
Soundness of State's Judicial System, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, May 7, 1985, at 1, 1-2.
63. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1202-03, 1316-20; Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard
Look Judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 51 (1984).
64. On the many forms of entities in the executive branch, see Seidman, A Typology of Govern-
ment, in FEDERAL REORGANIZATION: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 33 (P. Szanton ed. 1981).
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the Congress. 65 In addition, within these larger units, there are often
semi-autonomous divisions that nominally report to the department or
agency heads, but also have some independent relationship to the Presi-
dent or the Congress, and sometimes both.66 The numerous links with
the Office of the President are created and sustained through the chief
executive's appointment and removal powers, 67 through various specific
statutory provisions,68 through various central management offices-
principally the OMB69-and the cabinet and the White House staff.70
With respect to the Congress, there are many formal reporting and over-
sight relationships71 that, as noted in a recent study by Herbert Kaufman
65. See the discussion of presidential influence over "independent" administrators who receive
direct grants of statutory authority in Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 627, 641 (1983) (observing that typically the president has not been able to effectively deal
with agency inaction). The case of a private corporation running a government program under the
control of Congress rather than the president is discussed in Note, The Constitutionality of Exclud-
ing Desegregation from the Legal Services Program, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1984).
66. For example, the Food and Drug Administration and the Social Security Administration
are often in direct contact with the Office of the President, even though both are divisions within the
Department of Health and Human Services. The same observation can be made about the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the Department of
Justice, and the Internal Revenue Service within the Treasury Department.
67. The constitutional grant to the executive, U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.2, has been held to be
subject to statutory limitations except when "purely executive officers" are involved, Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935). Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926) (statutory provision restricting the President's power of removal of a postmaster is uncon-
stitutional), with Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (a Federal Trade
Commissioner, as a member of a "quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial" body created by Congress,
cannot be removed without cause before the expiration of his term), and Wiener v. United States,
357 U.S. 349 (1958) (same reasoning applied to a member of War Claims Commission).
68. See, for example, the discretion allowed the President in acting on the findings and recom-
mendations of the International Trade Commission in the area of "import relief," 19 U.S.C.A. §§
2251-2253 (1980 & Supp. 1985)-a discretion which the statute purports to subject to a form of
legislative veto, see id. at § 2252(c). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b) (1982) (presidential authority to
override a decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the granting of a special export li-
cense, subject to legislative veto by concurrent resolution).
69. See, eg., Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1035 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982); Controlling Paperwork Burdens on the Public, 5 C.F.R. pt. 1320 (1985) (OMB
regulations on the collection of information by federal agencies from individuals, businesses and
other private institutions, and state and local governments, issued pursuant to the Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1982)).
70. This area has been the subject of considerable controversy. See Strauss, The Place of Agen-
cies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 657-60
(1984) (discussion of "the conduit problem"). The Administrative Conference of the United States
has recommended that White House control be made more acceptable by placing "material factual
information" contained in intragovernmental communications "in the public file" of an affected
rulemaking proceeding. 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-6 (1985).
71. For example, "[in the Ninety-fifth Congress,. .. FDA representatives appeared before a
total of thirty-two congressional bodies. . . eighty-five times in all." H. KAUFMAN, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS 48 (1981).
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published by the Brookings Institution, are manifestations of a far more
pervasive influence:
At the center of the pattern of relationships for all the [executive
branch bureau] chiefs was Congress-its members, collectively and in-
dividually, its committees, its staffs, its evaluative arms (the General
Accounting Office in particular). This set of congressional and con-
gressionally related workers in the machinery of government seemed
rarely to be out of the administrators' consciousness. The chiefs were
constantly looking over their shoulders, as it were, at the elements of
the legislative establishment relevant to their agencies-taking stock of
moods and attitudes, estimating reactions to contemplated decisions
and actions, trying to prevent misunderstandings and avoidable con-
flicts, and planning responses when storm warnings appeared on the
horizon. Not that cues and signals from Capitol Hill had to be ferreted
out; the denizens of the Hill were not shy about issuing suggestions,
requests, demands, directives, and pronouncements.72
Thus, there is an abundance of both formal and actual controls and
influences upon the administrative process deriving from the two
branches of the federal government that have a popular mandate. To the
extent that this collection of influences is to be criticized, the criticism
must go to the heart of democratic theory, not just to the administrative
process. If democracy means anything, it must mean that the majority's
"whims" do control policy within the broad limits set by basic constitu-
tional safeguards. To the extent that the political branches are effective
in translating the majority's whims into policy, a critique of the results
must be directed against the substance of the majority's social priorities
or against the way our Constitution embodies democracy.
Given these existing political controls, it is ironic that most of the
thrust toward judicialization has come from the political branches. Over
the last generation Congress has made the internal processes of adminis-
trative decisionmaking less and less discretionary, and more and more
formal.73 Various types of judicially enforceable "rights" related to the
administrative process have been created. These procedural provisions
have not only benefited the due process interests of the regulated, but
also given special interest groups the power to significantly influence reg-
ulatory agendas, often in the face of opposition from both the regulated
and the regulators. 74 Congressional action directed against specific prop-
erty interests and against the institutional power of the executive branch
should not be surprising; that is the way the Framers believed our polit-
72. Id. at 47.
73. The many "hybrid" rulemaking statutes enacted from 1969 to 1981 are described in AD-
MINISTRATIvE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 65-71
(1983).
74. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 177, 177-87.
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ical system would work, given human nature. 75 What is surprising-
and, I would argue, counterproductive-is that the recent approach to
government decisionmaking adopted by Congress has resulted in the
augmenting of the institutional power of the third branch and, therefore,
of those special interests with the capacity to use the courts to achieve
judicially what they could not obtain politically. 76
75. Alexander Hamilton, writing on the need for "maintaining in practice the necessary parti-
tion of power among the several departments" of the national government, urged that
the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same depart-
ment, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitu-
tional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of
attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . It may be a reflection on
human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51. Hamilton also thought the same general approach could "guard one part
of society against the injustice of the other part," "by comprehending in the society so many separate
descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improb-
able, if not impracticable." Id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 48 QJ. Madison) (the separation of
powers doctrine in practice).
76. Recently the United States Supreme Court decided Heckler v. Chaney, 53 U.S.L.W. 4385
(U.S. Mar. 20, 1985). This case, with its rather bizarre fact pattern, did not involve a special proce-
dural statute, but it does present a classic illustration ofjudicialization's deleterious effects. The suit
was brought by death row inmates seeking to have the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pre-
vent the states of Oklahoma and Texas from using certain injectible drugs to carry out death
sentences. The inmates "claimed that the FDA was required [under provisions of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f), 355 (1982)] to approve the drugs as 'safe and effective' for
human execution before they could be distributed in interstate commerce," id. at 4385. The prison-
ers received afavorable decision in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, thus
using a statute passed to protect public health to temporarily stave off executions decreed in the
interests of public safety. This is surely one of the more extreme examples of "rights" created by a
regulatory statute being used against the regulator, the regulatee, and the public interest. The notion
that both the regulating agency and the object of regulation are somehow unable or unwilling to
bring such a case before the judiciary when necessary produces this bizarre designation of death row
inmates as the true representatives of the public interestl
The Chaney case is notable not only as an extreme example of the judicialization of the adminis-
trative process, but also because of the Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals. The Court
said that the case turned upon "the extent to which determinations by the FDA not to exercise its
enforcement authority over the use of drugs in interstate commerce may be judicially reviewed," 53
U.S.L.W. at 4386 (emphasis in original), and went on to find that section 701(a)(2) of the APA
contains a presumption that agency decisions not to institute enforcement proceedings are unreview-
able, and that the presumption was not overcome in this case, id. at 4389. An indication that an
even broader change in philosophy may radiate from the core of this case is found in the opinion's
comment that "[i]n addition to. . .administrative concerns, we note that when an agency refuses to
act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights,
and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect." Id. at 4387-88
(emphasis in original). This general approach indicates a sense of the role of courts as guardians
against abuses of the administrative process, rather than as participants in that process. But cf id. at
4394 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The problem of agency refusal to act is one of the
pressing problems of the modern administrative state, given the enormous powers, for both good and
ill, that agency inaction, like agency action, holds over citizens. .. .Because the Court's approach,
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Similarly, although in theory the numerous legislative veto provi-
sions enacted over the last several decades aimed at review of the admin-
istrative process by a decision of political will, their practical effect was to
create another procedural level: appeal from agency decisionmaking to
the staffs of congressional committees. 77 And the vague statutory man-
dates made politically possible by the reassuring presence of the legisla-
tive vetoes invited the kind of judicial "supervision" of agency policy and
direction associated with over-broad grants of power. 78 These new levels
and kinds of appeals have had the effect of further reducing agency dis-
cretion. The agencies were thereby further constrained by outside forces,
without gaining much additional regular, coherent, and politically re-
sponsible policy input. In this sense, the Supreme Court's 1983 decision
in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha79 represents a surpris-
ing movement away from judicialization, 80 and may result in some sim-
plification of the administrative process. The decision eliminated a vague
set of review structures that may well be replaced by true congressional
policy oversight, 81 if some of the proposals introduced into Congress
soon after Chadha was handed down 82 really reflect a new concern in
if taken literally, would take the courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far too many
cases, I join only the judgment today.")
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted in a concluding dictum that
The fact that the drugs involved in this case are ultimately to be used in imposing the death
penalty must not lead this Court or other courts to import profound differences of opinion
over the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution into the
domain of administrative law.
Id. at 4389.
77. For a discussion of the constitutional, statutory, and policy issues raised by the legislative
veto of agency rulemaking, see Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1372-8 1.
78. Cf., eg., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (construing the "broad" and "flexible" policy enunciated in the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982)); infra notes 83-98 and accompa-
nying text.
79. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
80. An argument can also be made to the contrary that, insofar as the legislative veto did serve
a useful function, Chadha is yet another example ofjudicialization, removing what should be deci-
sions of will from the political branches. There is undoubtedly some validity in this view. To the
extent that Chadha is a complex case with potential application to a highly diverse set of laws and
administrative contexts, it is difficult to characterize it broadly as either a pro- or an anti-judicializa-
tion development. I am indebted to Mr. Thomas M. Susman for his perceptive thoughts on this
point.
81. "True congressional policy oversight" means the formulation and subsequent adjustment of
policy, not the reversal of particular executive decisions or the review of the minutiae of administra-
tive regulations and procedures.
82. E-g., H.R. 3939, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983) ("To amend title 5, United States Code, and
the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate, to make regulations more cost-effective, to
ensure review of rules, to improve regulatory planning and management, to provide for periodic
review of regulations, and to enhance public participation in and congressional oversight and control
of the regulatory process ...."); S. 1080, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13, 129 CONG. REc. S17,081
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (providing for congressional review of agency rulemaking). A more recent
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Congress with the administrative process.
But neither the additional procedural legislation enacted in recent
decades, nor the pre-Chadha legislative vetoes can account, by them-
selves, for the full strength of the trend toward judicially modeled for-
malization. Perhaps the most important way in which Congress itself
has contributed to the limiting of agency discretion and the judicializa-
tion of the administrative process has been the granting of broad substan-
tive mandates to the agencies to fulfill their statutory purposes. This
seems like a paradoxical if not absurd statement. How can broad man-
dates lead to a narrowing of real agency discretion? The answer is not as
subtle as might be imagined. Judicial review becomes far more impor-
tant in defining the direction and meaning of a statute when that statute
sets out vague and possibly self-contradictory mandates to an agency,
rather than clear or simple directives that leave little room for any judi-
cial doubt as to the agency's mission.8 3 Under a broad mandate, and in
the absence of ongoing congressional policy oversight, the courts become
the arbiters not only of claims by individuals against the agencies, but of
agency policy direction as well. 84 The well-known case of Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. 85 provides a good example of just how this can occur.
State Farm involved a challenge to the rescission of a regulation pre-
viously issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966.86 The regulation had required the use of automatic crash pro-
tection devices-airbags or "passive" seatbelts-in motor vehicles manu-
factured after a certain date. It was alleged that the reversal of this
policy under the Reagan administration was unsupported by the data
available to the responsible agency and inconsistent with the purpose of
the enabling statute. In defining its scope of review, the Supreme Court
described the statutory basis of the controversy.
The Act, created for the purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and
deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents," ...
directs the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate [the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)] to issue motor vehi-
cle safety standards, that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for
motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms."
example is S. 1145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. RFc. S6267 (daily ed. May 15, 1985) ("To
increase the accountability of, policy coordination by, and management of priorities by agencies
through an improved mechanism for congressional oversight of the rules of agencies.").
83. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 382.
84. See, eg., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1111-12, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
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... In issuing these standards, the Secretary is directed to consider
"relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed
standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particu-
lar type of motor vehicle, and the "extent to which such standards will
contribute to carrying out the purposes" of the Act. 87
The criteria the statute establishes for the guidance of the Secretary
and the NHTSA are obviously very broad, and do not provide any clear
basis for objective substantive review. Rather, they endorse the type of
discretion normally given to an expert. It is not unreasonable in this
context for one policy expert to disagree with another. Nor would it be
inappropriate for one political official to second-guess another. As a re-
sult of debate sparked by such disagreement, a legislative reversal of an
administrative judgment in this kind of situation is the very stuff of de-
mocracy. The substantive issue underlying the procedural dispute de-
cided in State Farm was, after all, a classic political controversy, 88 and in
fact the litigants in the case included those interest groups that would be
expected to make their concerns known to their elected representatives
and so bring their "case" before the legislative forum. When, therefore, a
properly delegated policy decision of this sort is effectively reversed by a
supposedly non-political entity, which necessarily purports to have no
policy preference other than the carrying out of a statutory program,
questions naturally arise as to whether the judicial branch is assuming a
monitoring function with respect to substantive policy, and on what basis
it could possibly assume that role.
The Supreme Court was sensitive enough to this concern to note
that the "scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency,"'8 9 and it chastized the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit for the latter's "misguided" analysis that had derived
from certain inconclusive legislative events a heightened standard of re-
view of the agency's action.90 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court itself
found the NHTSA's rescission to be "arbitrary and capricious," at least
inform, because all aspects of the rationale of the prior policy had not, in
the Court's view, been adequately dealt with in the explanation of the
new one.91 The Court focused on the lack of internal consistency in the
implementation of the statute generated by the NHTSA's stated reasons
for its rescission of the automatic occupant restraint regulation, as if the
87. 103 S. Ct. at 2862 (citations and footnote omitted).
88. This aspect of the case is acknowledged in Justice Rehnquist's dissent, see infra note 96.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
90. Id. at 2867.
91. Id. at 2868.
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Administration was not fully aware that it was overturning the previous
policy.
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard on its face seems extremely
deferential, 92 but as applied, especially with reference to an administra-
tive judgment made under an extremely broad statutory mandate, it has
the potential to convert a procedural review into at least temporary con-
trol over substantive policy. Asking whether the agency "examine[d] the
relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action" 93
is itself so broad a standard that it can be used not only to overturn
egregiously arbitary acts, but also to intrude into the realm of legitimate
discretionary agency decisionmaking. There is no bright line between a
judicial challenge to an agency's reasoning-given that the agency does
not purport to be engaged in a decision of logic-and a court's "sub-
stitut[ion of] its judgment for that of the agency."'94 In State Farm, the
objections to the NHTSA's "explanation" smack of the review normally
exercised by a superior over a subordinate in a bureaucratic hierarchy.
Our constitutional system holds high the notion of the supremacy of the
law, but it never has contemplated the supremacy of the courts in a bu-
reaucratic sense.
The ultimate result of the State Farm litigation was the promulga-
tion of a new rule that extended until the late 1980's the deadline for
installation of automatic occupant restraints in all new cars, and pro-
vided for an alternative approach based on the sufficiently widespread
use of regular seatbelts enforced under state law. 95 But in the interim,
92. [IThe agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made." Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168. . . (1962). In review-
ing that explanation, we must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Bowman
Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, [419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974);] Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe [401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)]. Normally, an agency rule would
be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
103 S. Ct. at 2866-67.
93. Id. at 2866.
94. Id.
95. The Supreme Court's opinion in State Farm was handed down on June 24, 1983. On Sep-
tember 1, 1983, the Department of Transportation (DOT) suspended the automatic restraint require-
ment for one year, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,908 (1983). After careful study and two public comment periods,
the DOT issued a final rule in July, 1984 requiring "installation of automatic restraints in all new
cars beginning with model year 1990 (September 1, 1989) [subject to a phase-in over a three-year
period beginning with model year 1987] unless, prior to that time, state mandatory belt usage laws
are enacted that cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population." 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 28,962
(1984) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
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the courts were used to reverse a considered decision of will.96 This is
not to say that the judicial branch as a whole has purposefully cast itself
in the role of arbiter of policy. However, State Farm and other cases in
the same vein contribute to the widespread notion that such matters as
the appropriateness of motor vehicle occupant safety devices are best de-
termined in accordance with a model based on the judicial process.
The grant of a large measure of agency discretion-such as that con-
tained in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act-is one of
those familiar two-edged swords. On the one hand, insofar as a statute
does not circumscribe implementation policy by means of specific provi-
sions, it can be inferred that Congress contemplated an extremely flexible
ongoing policy decisionmaking process, relying primarily-in the ab-
sence of subsequent legislation-on those formal and informal controls
and influences emanating from the political branches to monitor and de-
limit agency action; on the other hand, there exists an active piece of
legislation that the courts feel an obligation to protect from de facto re-
peal by the executive branch.97 A vacuum is created by this sort of legis-
lative approach, and it is into this vacuum that the judicial apparatus
naturally rushes, substituting its procedures for decisions of will, but in
the process unavoidably making a form of policy "judgment" as well.
Why are so many of our economic, health, safety, and welfare stat-
utes-the staple of the administrative state-written in this way? Why
doesn't the Congress seek to avoid the inevitable administrative law
problems that materialize in the vacuums it creates by overly broad dele-
gation? It might well be that the legislature, like other sectors of our
society, has succumbed to the paralysis of political will made possible by
the judicial alternative. Facing the considerable and often notorious diffi-
culties of hammering out in statutory form a substantive compromise on
a crucial social issue,98 the path of least resistance presents an attractive,
often irresistible alternative. The legislator's own political future and in-
terests argue against firm policy decisions. In setting auto safety stan-
On the day the rule was announced, but prior to its publication in the Federal Register, a suit
was filed challenging certain provisions of the rule as well as the DOT's authority to promulgate it.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, No. 84-1301 (D. C. Cir. July 11, 1984). This case has been
briefed and argued, but no decision has been rendered.
96. Cf State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reason-
able basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations.").
97. Cf. id. at 2875 n.* ("Of course, a new administration may not choose not to enforce laws of
which it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in carrying out its regulatory functions.
But in this case,. . . Congress has not required the agency to require passive restraints.").




dards there are powerful political interests-auto manufacturers, unions,
insurance companies, consumer activists, importers-that will be an-
gered by whatever standard is set. However, a procedural decision that
gives everybody "rights" in the "process" draws attention and anger
away from the legislator, and may indeed make the legislator seem like a
friend to all. Thus it is that we may have reached the point where the
decisionmaking vacuum, routinely filled by judicial process, is exerting a
se-perpetuating attraction all its own.
Of course, passing along the "hard" decisions to the agencies does
not end the matter, as State Farm and many other similar cases demon-
strate. The courts, themselves constrained by both constitutional imper-
atives and their own view of decisionmaking, apply a "hard look" to
those "hard" decisions made by agencies, and this leads to unfortunate
intrusions into the essentially political domain of the agencies and their
missions. Thus we are brought back to the central dilemma confronting
present-day administrative law. We have established administrative
agencies with technical expertise and a coherence of vision on specific
problems. However, when they come up with decisions significant ele-
ments of the society do not like, we shift the decisions to judicial bodies,
the structure and function of which is based upon premises diametrically
opposed to the theories upon which the administrative agencies were cre-
ated. The review and, in some instances, the reversal of those adminis-
trative decisions are thereby accomplished in ways that tend to
undermine the conceptual basis of government regulation in our modem
administrative state. And, most importantly, as a result of such political
decisionmaking by default, we delude ourselves that we have been spared
from having to confront the need for decisions of will.
III. A NEw DAY?
The causes of judicialization obviously run deeper than the mere
identity of the decisionmakers our society is willing to acknowledge.
Even if today there is less distrust generally of the federal bench than of
the leadership of the agencies, that alone cannot account for the wide-
spread adoption of an approach to public decisionmaking that is for-
eign-if not hostile-to the political process. Accordingly, the cure for
the systemic dysfunction is not a simple matter of staffing choices and
policies. Indeed, judicialization can be viewed as symptomatic of an even
more fundamental issue, one that goes beyond a choice of decisionmak-
ing methodologies. Perhaps our polity senses that it is not flawed regula-
tion that is bad, but that the very concept of regulation, on the scale we
practice it, is flawed.
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In the first quarter of this century, relativity theory and quantum
mechanics rapidly displaced classical physics because the classical world
view was seriously flawed.99 It did not provide a coherent explanation of
reality. Certain observational evidence could only be explained by the
new theories, which were radically inconsistent with the old ones; this
clash of ideas caused the old paradigm to disintegrate and make room for
a new way of seeing the world. The last fifty years of government admin-
istration have presented administrative law theory with a similar type of
irresistible intellectual pressure. We do not have any coherent justifica-
tion for the administrative process we confront every day. Legislators
and the courts continually fashion new procedural rights, processes, and
theories of review applicable to administrative decisionmaking. Virtually
every imaginable administrative system can be found embodied in some
governmental structure. The effect of independent agency status, techni-
cal expertise, judicial review, notice and comment rulemaking, and pub-
lic disclosure on the actual processes of government are debated with
little agreement even as to the premises of the discussion. Indeed, it
might be more accurate to analogize current administrative law theory
not to classical physics, but to alchemy or astrology! I believe it is time
to reexamine the premises of the administrative, interventionist state, and
to do so from all of the points of view on the political spectrum. Radical
thoughts are needed from conservative thinkers, and libertarian analyses
from liberals.
In order for this self-examination and analysis to be a fruitful intel-
lectual exercise with the potential to reshape our governmental system in
a positive way, it must focus on several fundamental issues that have
come to be regarded as somewhat unfashionable topics for serious intel-
lectual exploration. 1°° Let me suggest three. First, some lines must be
drawn to define what is an appropriate governmental function and what
is not. If administrative law is to be something other than the hand-
maiden of the omnipresent state, we must ask in a principled rather than
an ad hoe way what are the proper boundaries of governmental power.
A second and obviously related question has to do with the "rights" of
the citizen with reference to the processes of government. To what ex-
tent should there be differences between the plethora of legislatively and
judicially generated private interests, rights of action, beneficiary claims,
and agency procedural requirements on the one hand, and the tradition-
99. See generally J. GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHR6DINGER'S CAT: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND
REALITY 19-122 (1984).
100. There are some notable exceptions to this trend: for example, R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 2; Strauss, supra note 70.
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ally recognized rights emanating from the Constitution and the common
law on the other? And the third question has to do with the increasing
commingling of functions among the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment. This commingling has appeared in various forms, almost all of
which have involved the burgeoning administrative process: the regula-
tory role of the executive branch; the creation of the independent agen-
cies; the highly detailed nature of some modem legislation-coexisting
with broad and amorphous grants of delegated power in other statutes;
the ombudsman-like role adopted by many representatives and senators;
the growth of an enormous administrative judiciary in the executive
branch; and the increasingly significant effect that federal judicial deci-
sions are having on both individual interests and social policy. We need
to ask, then, does the tripartite scheme of powers established by the
Framers in 1787 need fundamental reform-or fundamental restora-
tion-in light of the development of the administrative state over the last
fifty years?101
These radical questions will require both an intellectual and a polit-
ical debate for their resolution. This will occur not simply because it is
intellectually stimulating or because administrative law specialists think
it worthwhile, but because very real problems of liberty, meaningful jus-
tice, and efficiency arise daily within the existing administrative law
framework. In spite of significant and positive efforts in the direction of
regulatory reform, 0 2 the administrative state is creating rather than solv-
ing social and economic problems. It has created unrealistic expectations
in the health, safety, and welfare area that have put an unacceptable
strain on the legitimacy of law, and this is a danger that is of incalculable
magnitude to any free society. The current system is not functioning
properly and the dysfunction is growing. Fundamental issues need to be
debated because the existing theories underlying administrative law no
longer provide a coherent answer to these problems, or even a general
sense of direction toward their solution.
101. Cf Strauss, supra note 70, at 667 (concluding that we must "give up the notion that [the
Constitution] embodies a neat division of all government into three separate branches, each endowed
with a unique portion of governmental power and employing no other").
102. Eg., Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703
(amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, to terminate certain
functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board and transfer certain functions of the Board to the Depart-
ment of Transportation); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812
(codified, as amended, at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2904-2905, 3501-3520, 5 U.S.C. § 5315, 20 U.S.C. § 1221-3,
30 U.S.C. 1211, 42 U.S.C. 292h (1982)); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1705 (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app. and at 18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 878,
1116, 1201 (1982)) (designed to encourage an air transportation system which relies on competitive
market forces); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1035 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,174, 3 C.F.R. 462 (1980).
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Such basic questions-the scope of governmental action; the nature
and extent of individual rights to be protected in the face of such action;
and the need to sort out anew the separate powers granted to the three
branches of the federal government-can hardly be addressed adequately
here, but there may be some value in considering how answers to them
might give rise to some possible alternatives to the continuing judicializa- "
tion of the administrative process. In order to do this, it is useful to
consider judicialization in terms of its three primary manifestations,
mentioned at the beginning of this essay: overproceduralization of gov-
ernmental processes, excessive reliance upon trial-type procedures in
non-judicial settings, and intrusive judicial review of agency actions.
A. Overproceduralization.
Overproceduralization is the aspect of judicialization most readily
perceived as an evil in the political system. It has long been a whipping
boy; politicians, writers, and the man on the street traditionally have in-
veighed against bureaucrats, tangles of red tape, and governmental delay
and waste. The causes of this phenomenon are not, however, to be found
in the penchant of "pointy-headed" bureaucrats for thwarting the public
in a Kafkaesque world. I would argue that its primary cause is an at-
tempt by government to do too much. This overreaching in terms of the
overall scope of governmental functions inevitably leads to specific over-
loads in the system. There is, first, over-extension of the individual agen-
cies charged with the expansive functions. 10 3 When agencies attempt to
accomplish impossible tasks or tasks beyond the political or financial re-
sources available to them, their institutional structures are subjected to
enormous strain. The most basic defense mechanism such an organiza-
tion has is to insulate itself from controversial substantive decisions with
layers of procedure, quasi-judicial appeal boards, and highly complex
regulatory codes.
The expansion of government programs into more and more sub-
stantive areas has also resulted in an understanding of due process alien
to the framers of either the fifth or the fourteenth amendments, and this
in turn produces overproceduralization. Since Goldberg v. Kelly ' 4 we
have embraced an increasingly abstract conception of due process. The
103. Examples include the Social Security Administration and its disability program, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service and its border patrol responsibility, the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration's statutory mandate, and the Department of Agriculture and its farm subsidy
mission.
104. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing" 123 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1267,
1268, 1273, 1299-1300 (1975). The latest expansion of this version of due process is seen in Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985).
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right to a more or less formalized hearing has come to be held as an
article of faith. This is not a necessary implication of the Constitution's
mandate of due process. It has become a legal and judicial dogma that
fundamental fairness to participants can only be achieved through the
use of hearings with guaranteed procedural steps. While there is an over-
whelmingly convincing historical and moral argument for this view in
the area where the state seeks to impose criminal sanctions, the proposi-
tion is subject to serious question when grants of government benefits are
involved. The contemporary movement of the law away from the tradi-
tional dichotomy between rights and privileges 0 5 has had the effect of
ossifying administrative structures. It causes these structures to be pro-
gressively less responsive to the needs which they were created to ad-
105. Compare Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) ("The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable. . . . [Clonsideration of what procedures due process may require. . . must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action. Where it has been possible to characterize
that private interest (perhaps in oversimplification) as a mere privilege subject to the Executive's
plenary power, it has traditionally been held that notice and hearing are not constitutionally re-
quired" (footnote omitted)), and United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542
(1950) ("[aldmission of aliens to the United States is a privilege" to be "granted. . . only upon such
terms as the United States shall prescribe"), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (wel-
fare benefits are "a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them" and a
constitutional challenge to termination procedures "cannot be answered by an argument that public
assistance benefits are 'a "privilege" and not a "right"' " (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969) and citing illustrative cases) (footnote omitted)), and Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) ("It is not enough to
say, as did the district court in the present case, 'The right to attend a public college or university is
not in and of itself a constitutional right.' "). But see Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 69 (1982)
(reviewing post-Goldberg v. Kelly cases, especially those based on an "entitlement theory," and con-
cluding that, "like the prematurely rumored death of Mark Twain, .. reports of the demise of the
privilege doctrine have been greatly exaggerated").
It is possible to object to the due process developments exemplified by Goldberg v. Kelly and yet
be concerned that the distinction between "rights" and "privileges" not be misused in such a way as
to allow the government to condition its largesse on the giving up of substantive constitutional rights
and so accomplish-at least with respect to compliant beneficiaries-indirectly what it is forbidden
to do directly. On the latter point, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-49 (1968). But there is no self-contradiction in
such a view. The real problem, as Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306, 4314 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985), is that these cases represent
an ad hoc weighing which depends to a great extent upon how the Court subjectively views
the underlying interests at stake. The results. . . have been quite unpredictable. . . . The
lack of any principled standards in this area means that these procedural due process cases
will recur time and again. Every different set of facts will present a new issue on what
process was due and when. One way to avoid this subjective and varying interpretation of
the Due Process Clause in cases such as this is to hold that one who avails himself of
government entitlements accepts the grant of tenure along with its inherent limitations.
See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (genesis of
the now discredited "bitter with the sweet" approach, see Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4308).
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that has contributed to the current excessive reliance on them. From the
medieval trials by combat or compurgation to our most complex modern
federal civil litigation, there is an unspoken belief in the "trial" as the
best means of "settling" certain kinds of disputed fundamental questions.
One's "day in court" is such an appealing slogan because it implies a
quick, decisive, and final result. The idealized trial embodies all the
favorable connotations of this concept. Unfortunately, the reality is
somewhat different, especially in the area of administrative law. Ironi-
cally, it is the overuse of the trial concept that has tended to damage its
efficacy and hence its traditional reputation as the ultimate decisionmak-
ing device. In this sense, judicialization itself faces a procedural over-
extension similar to the substantive over-extensions plaguing the agen-
cies. When, therefore, Congress and the courts attempt to make even
informal rulemaking more and more trial-like, they not only defeat the
purposes of informal rulemaking, but also undermine the integrity of the
final bulwark represented by adjudication.
Referring to litigation in all of its forms, Chief Justice Burger urged
attorneys to "find a better way" in his 1982 State of the Judiciary
speech, 107 and Justice O'Connor echoed that view a year later when she
advised that courts be viewed only as a last resort in resolving dis-
putes. 108 Happily, we may already be experiencing somewhat of a
change in this area. Although a movement toward alternative dispute
resolution may still be a "muffled explosion,"'1 9 it has become widely
enough known to acquire an acronym ("ADR"), and it is now beginning
to make inroads into administrative decisionmaking as well as non-ad-
ministrative litigation.
For example, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), created
in 1978 to hear job-related appeals from federal employees, has instituted
an expedited case resolution process that emphasizes mediation by
MSPB officials.110 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has
developed an innovative three-tier procedure prescribing different levels
of formality and expedition for different types of cases in which custom-
ers file claims for reparation against commodity professionals."' The
107. Isn't There a Better Way?, annual report on the state of the judiciary, delivered in Chicago
on Jan. 24, 1982, reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
108. Unpublished address given at Brigham Young University (Feb. 1, 1983).
109. Ray, Dispute Resolution: "A Muffled Explosion, " NUJ REP., May 1984, at 9.
110. Lubbers, Dispute Resolution in Federal Agencies, NU REP., Nov. 1984, at 9. For a report
on the MSPB program, see A. ADAMS & J. FIGUEROA, EXPEDITING SETrLEMENT OF EMPLOYEE
GRIEVANCES IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR (1985) (report prepared for and published by the Adminis-
trative Conference of the U.S.).
111. See Nelson, CFTC's New Ruler Some Innovative Approaches to Adjudication, AD. L.
NEWS, Spring 1984, at 1.
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dress. As in the development of the ancient forms of action in the
common law, turning procedures into due process rights turns govern-
ment programs into ritual acts increasingly unrelated to real human
needs.
Yet another connection between the scope of government activities
and overproceduralization is the result of the interaction of benefit and
grant programs with the dynamism of the American society and its econ-
omy. As these programs mature, they change the social context they
were created to deal with. For example, a research grant program cre-
ates a market for its own grants. A new industry develops to obtain
those grants. Firms, individuals, and institutions come to be dependent
upon this funding. Expectations are altered. In a democratic society
with excellent communications, an ever wider constituency for these ben-
efits develops.106 Unless an unlimited budget exists at the granting
agency, there will be an ever-increasing disparity between the supply of
and demand for benefits. Because the market mechanism is unavailable,
a qualitative screening mechanism must be developed. This inevitably
leads, under the influence of our due process views and the need to ac-
commodate political pressures and the "rights" of applicants, to ever-
increasing proceduralization. This, of course, causes the applicants to re-
spond in kind, completing the frustrating-if not vicious--circle.
To the extent that overproceduralization can be said to follow inevi-
tably from major government intervention in social and economic affairs,
and to the extent that we want to change the resulting situation, we will
have to make many hard substantive choices. In some areas we may de-
cide that the burden of overproceduralization is the least undesirable al-
ternative open to us. With respect to other major programs, we might
conclude that central oversight and funding are in fact inconsistent with
our basic societal values, and find a solution in either federalism or the
abandonment or curtailment of those programs. Still another approach
is to rethink the current concepts of due process in the area of govern-
mental benefits law.
B. Overreliance on Trial-Like Procedures.
With respect to the second aspect of judicialization-excessive reli-
ance on trial-like procedures-it should be noted that there is an impor-
tant historical bias in favor of trial-like modes of decisionmaking, a bias
106. Cf THE REAGAN RECORD: AN ASSESSMENT OF AMERICA'S CHANGING DOMESTIC PRI-
ORITIES 222 (J. Palmer & I. Sawbill eds. 1984) (the traditional structure of federal matching grants
and regulatory programs encourages state and local governments and special interest groups to
lobby for increased funding and favorable regulation, thereby "sustain[ing] public spending and.. .
insulat[ing] intergovernmental programs from the scrutiny of taxpayers").
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Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission uses a "settlement judge," an ALJ not otherwise in-
volved with the case, to facilitate negotiations between the parties. 112
The Department of Health and Human Services' Grant Appeals Board
regularly seeks to provide or assist in the selection of a mediator to help
resolve or clarify issues concerning grant disputes. Board personnel have
received considerable training in mediation and negotiation techniques as
part of this effort.113 In non-adjudicatory areas as well, the federal gov-
ernment is experimenting with departures from a trial-like mode of
resolving disputes. Under its program to register pesticides, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's governing statute requires the use of arbitra-
tion to establish the compensation to be paid to an initial applicant when
a later applicant uses data previously submitted by the former.1 4 This
provision was recently upheld by the Supreme Court.115 And in the
sometimes contentious area of rulemaking, the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) has used "regulatory negotiation" to formulate stan-
dards to govern flight crew rest requirements. 1 6 The appropriateness of
this approach is still being debated, but participants from business, labor,
and other groups have applauded the innovation 17 because it brings to-
gether interested parties to discuss and tentatively formulate the FAA's
proposed rules before they are published in the Federal Register. The
EPA and OSHA have also used "reg-neg," 118 and the procedure has
been recommended by the Administrative Conference as a way of reduc-
ing the delay and litigiousness that often accompanies rulemaking. 119
It would be premature to see in these indications a major or perma-
nent trend away from the use of trial-like procedures. Nor would such a
trend necessarily result in a better, less judicialized system. Arbitration,
mediation, and negotiation may only set the stage for even more elabo-
rate forms of judicialization. They might, as the history of equity juris-
112. See The Settlement: "Splitting of the Differences" MONrrOR June 27, 1983, at 1 (interview
with Curtis L. Wagner, Jr., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Chief Administrative Law
Judge).
113. See Barrett, Mediation and Adjudication: The Double Track Approach, 30 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 436 (1983).
114. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (1982).
115. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
116. See Lempert, Participants See Value in Reg-Neg's First Flight, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 1983,
at 2.
117. Id.
118. See Harter, Regulatory Negotiation: The Experience So Far, RESOLVE, Winter 1984, at 1.
119. 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1985); cf Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71




diction illustrates, 120 become as formalized and rigid, or more so, than
the trial-like procedures they are designed to replace. They .might also
lead to a masking of the underlying judicialization; their existence might
be seen as a solution when in fact it only creates new problems.
Still, the current growth in these techniques, and the willingness of
the system to experiment with them, is healthy. Despite the existing em-
phasis on trial-like decisionmaking, apparently there is enough flexibility
in the system to recognize the problem and seek a solution. This is en-
couraging, and deserves to be encouraged.
C. Intrusive Judicial Review.
Professor Davis has traced increased judicial activism in the field of
administrative law to legislative prescriptions that introduced procedural
requirements over and above those set forth in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.121 Describing and applauding this development, Professor Da-
vis has written:
[D]uring the 1970's ... the courts [began] drawing good ideas from
any and all sources, including statutes that [did] not apply to particu-
lar cases, for improving the legal requirements for rulemaking proce-
dure. Indeed, in extraordinary fashion, the legal frontier [was] pushed
out by both judges and legislators, each stimulating the other with re-
spect to the new ideas that [were thought to be] needed. . . . [T]he
degree of interaction between judicial thinking and legislative thinking
is new. The partnership of legislators and judges in the grand enter-
prise of producing a better legal and governmental system may be su-
perior to what either legislators or judges can produce without the
partnership and the interaction.1 22
In 1978, Professor-now Judge-Scalia analyzed the activism demon-
strated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
imposing on agency informal rulemaking extra requirements that were
not contemplated by, and in many cases contrary to the thrust of, the
APA. Referring to the notion of a "partnership of legislators and
judges," Judge Scalia wrote,
There may be some debate concerning the virtue or vice of legislative
activism in the area of administrative procedure. . . . What is un-
questionable, however, is that such activism cannot coexist with funda-
mental legislation of the sort the Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee
pronounces the APA to be. Not only is legislative insouciance for the
basic statute ultimately bound to infect the courts with its own spirit
(as indeed it probably should), but the legislative prescription of partic-
ular variations from the procedural norm provides the pretext-and
120. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY 1-12 (1948).
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1982).
122. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 56, at § 2.19.
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perhaps the necessity-for the addition of judge-made variations to the
statutory scheme. Witness, for example, the D.C. Circuit's conclu-
sions that legislative prescription (contrary to the APA) of a "substan-
tial evidence" review test for rulemaking implicitly requires that the
agency decision be made "on the record" and that "some sort of adver-
sary, adjudicative-type procedures" be used. 123
Judge Scalia found this particular "partnership of legislators and
judges" to be objectionable because of the status of the APA as the fun-
damental set of procedural guidelines for the agencies. Departing from
the APA without concern for the incoherence-a "statutory Babel"-
that it was bound to produce displayed, in Judge Scalia's opinion, "a
devil-may-care attitude. . . [and]-even worse-a profound ignorance
concerning just what. . .[was] being departed from."1 24 I would cer-
tainly agree with these observations. Seven years later, the trend is con-
tinuing. Congress has learned to "pass the buck" by creating layers of
procedure in politically difficult substantive areas. And the courts have
not impeded this development because procedure is, after all, the very
essence of judicial activity. To the extent that procedurally-oriented judi-
cial activism in the administrative law area reflects Congress's departure
from the APA as the appropriate and established norm, substantive judi-
cial activism can be traced to the lack of a coherent and generally ac-
cepted theory on the limits and function of the administrative state.
IV. CONCLUSION
General dissatisfaction with and a pervasive distrust of the adminis-
trative process as an effective way of dealing with some of our society's
most important concerns has led to the intellectual illusion that policy
decisions-decisions of will--can somehow be made in an objective fash-
ion by transplanting them into an apolitical setting and imposing on
them the apolitical procedures appropriate to decisions of logic. All of
the foregoing factors, working together, form a powerful engine driving
contemporary administrative law judicial activism, quite independent of
any ideological predispositions on the part of the federal judiciary. The
effect of this shift in methodology has been a predictable abdication of
substantive agency prerogatives. It is simply not possible to rely to such
an extent on a methodology so alien to political decisionmaking and not
have those procedural preferences begin to dictate substantive results as
well. If ever there was a modern illustration of the nineteenth century
123. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D. C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup.
Cr. REV. 345, 387-88 (footnotes omitted). Judge Scalia served as the Chairman of the Administra-
tive Conference from 1972 to 1974.
124. Id. at 387.
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legal scholar Maine's remark that "substantive law has ... the look of
being. . . secreted in the interstices of procedure," 12 5 administrative law
provides it.
The alternative to this result can only be found in a fundamental
reappraisal of our governmental system. I am referring here not only to
the redefinition of the limits of governmental power and the meaning of
private rights, but also to the third basic area of inquiry suggested above:
the need to sort out anew the constitutional powers of the branches of the
federal government. The categories familiar to most of our constitutional
history have had less and less practical significance since the late 1930's.
No meaningful new model, incorporating the realities of the administra-
tive state, has taken their place. Rather, amidst the rapid ad hoc growth
of the administrative state and the reactive development of an adminis-
trative law, our legal system seems to have given up any real quest for a
constitutional authority for what is clearly a fundamental current feature
of our government.
Lacking any real theory of the current governmental order, we have
witnessed in increasing judicialization the twilight of administrative law.
In this sense administrative law has bravely sought to do what cannot be
done: provide a coherent rationale for a system of order, justice, and
liberty without an accepted constitutional basis. The dawn will only suc-
ceed the twilight in this region when we reconstruct a constitutional
foundation upon which to rebuild a coherent and effective administrative
law.
The search for a true theory of administrative law is really the quest
for a well-ordered constitutional system. I believe it was Montesquieu,
writing before the beginning of our Republic, who observed that a nation
might lose its liberties in a day, and yet not miss them for a century.
Judicialization is a warning that we have begun to lose something pre-
cious. If we do lose it, it will be, I fear, much sooner than a century
before we realize the full consequences.
125. H. MmN, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1886).
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